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Farmland plays a central role in the financial health of the U.S. agricultural sector. Farm real 
estate makes up over 80% of the value of the sector’s asset base and serves as the primary source 
of collateral for farm loans (USDA 2019). However, despite farmland’s prominent role in the 
agricultural economy, it remains a challenge to accurately measure the aggregate value of farm 
real estate. A major reason for this fact is farmland’s very low turnover: on average, less than 
one percent of the stock of U.S. farmland is traded every year (Sherrick and Barry 2003; Zhang 
and Beek 2016). Zhang, Plastina, and Sawadgo (2018) show that half of the farmland in Iowa 
has had the same owner for at least twenty years, and many transactions are between family 
members and thus not arm’s length. Another reason is that tracts being traded at any point in 
time are heterogeneous in quality, location, surrounding land use mix, and sale type (Borchers, 
Ifft, and Kuethe 2014). In addition, it could take three to nine months between the time the sale is 
agreed upon and the time it is registered in public county records, which makes it difficult to 
ascribe a specific date to the corresponding price. Thus, transaction prices are not as informative 
as desired. Furthermore, there are no consolidated sources of data such as futures markets, Case-
Shiller residential housing price indices, or Zillow-style farmland sales information, which 
would allow to quickly gauge representative values for farmland.1 
In response, institutions such as land grant universities, Federal Reserve banks, 
professional societies, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conduct periodic surveys 
of producers or agricultural professionals to measure current market conditions (Kuethe and Ifft 
2013). While USDA surveys sample agricultural producers, most other opinion surveys rely on 
agricultural “experts” or professionals, including real estate agents, rural appraisers, agricultural 
lenders, farm managers, and county assessors (Zhang and Beek 2016). 
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Expert opinion survey estimates of current farmland values are critically important. On 
the one hand, accurate land market information is difficult to obtain without experts who closely 
monitor local farmland market movements given the prevalence of non-arm’s length 
transactions, limited farmland sales with time delays in public records, and important differences 
in farmland parcel characteristics and local market conditions. On the other hand, previous 
research suggests that on average land value estimates by these knowledgeable experts are 
comparable with average prices from arm’s length farmland sales records (Kuethe and Ifft 2013; 
Stinn and Duffy 2012; Bigelow, Ifft, and Kuethe 2020). As a result, farmland expert opinion 
surveys are widely used and attract substantial attention. For example, the 2015 Iowa State 
University (ISU) Land Value Survey overview was downloaded over 50,000 times and reported 
by over 50 media outlets. In addition, in many Midwestern states like Iowa, expert opinion 
surveys often are the only source providing consistent annual land value estimates at the county 
level. 
Interestingly, in spite of the wide use of opinion surveys and the attention they receive, 
little is known about the behavior of individual experts’ opinions over time. In particular, to the 
best of our knowledge, no study has investigated the degree to which survey estimates reflect 
respondents’ past and current information, and whether and to what extent they adjust or self-
correct over time. Our study focuses on experts’ estimates of current agricultural land values 
(dollars per acre) year over year.2 In particular, we examine the degree to which individual 
experts adjust their estimates in response to prior errors (i.e., the differences between their stated 
opinions and prevailing farmland prices), and to changes in market signals. Importantly, these 
expert estimates are opinions of current land values, not forecasts of future land prices. 
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Understanding the behavior of experts in responding to these surveys is critically 
important for the accuracy of the survey estimates compared to the unobservable prevailing 
farmland prices. To illustrate this point, consider Figure 1, which is based on expert estimates to 
the ISU survey for low quality land in South Central Iowa from 1980 through 2019.3 This graph 
depicts an example of the accuracy of average survey estimates in current dollars per acre 
(panels A and B) and percentage deviations from prevailing prices (panels C and D) when 
experts fail to fully correct prior errors or do not incorporate all changes in contemporary 
farmland prices. Blue lines represent observed average expert estimates, whereas other lines 
represent unobservable prevailing prices implied by different types of imperfections in the 
dynamics of experts’ opinions (which will be discussed in the Model section). The gray line in 
particular represents the price behavior implied by point estimates obtained in our econometric 
analysis. The graph shows price dynamics assuming that the observed average expert estimate is 
10% lower than the unobservable prevailing price at the beginning of the period (i.e., year 1980 
for panels A and C, and year 2003 for panels B and D). It can be observed that survey estimates 
could differ by more than 15% from implied prevailing farmland prices when experts’ opinions 
fail to fully correct prior errors (curves with y < 1 and x < 1) or fully incorporate 
contemporaneous changes in prevailing prices (curves with x < 1). 
We hypothesize that experts self-correct their prior errors. For example, if an expert 
provides a land value estimate substantially higher than the prevailing price one year, the 
following year she will tend to adjust current estimates downward. We also expect experts to 
update current estimates based on other relevant, contemporaneous farmland price signals. To 
test our hypotheses, we postulate an error-correction model (ECM) to represent the process by 
which experts update their responses. We conduct our investigation by applying Bayesian 
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methods to panel data consisting of 311 experts’ individual responses to the annual ISU Land 
Value Survey from 2005 through 2015. We use multiple different proxies for the unobservable 
prevailing prices, including county-level average farmland sales prices for 85% tillable cropland 
and the median expert opinion to the survey. Our empirical strategy explicitly addresses three 
important issues relevant to our data, namely, the likely non-stationarity of land values (Lence 
2001; 2014), the fact that “true” land values are not observable, and the Nickell bias (Nickell 
1981) associated with short panels like ours.4 
Overall, our results attest to the accuracy of expert opinions representing prevailing 
farmland prices. Our analysis suggests that experts’ responses conform to an ECM that almost 
fully corrects prior errors in one period, i.e., experts adjust most of the difference between their 
prior estimates and the corresponding prior prevailing prices in a single period. We also find that 
experts’ opinions incorporate most of the contemporary innovations in prevailing farmland 
prices. Interestingly, the speed at which experts self-correct and incorporate new market 
information depends on the quality of the land for which they furnish estimates. Both self-
correction and market news assimilation are fastest for high-quality land and slowest for low-
quality land. In addition, the long-run elasticity of individual experts’ estimates with respect to 
prevailing prices conforms to the theoretically consistent level of one.  
This study makes three important contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, it 
provides the first empirical investigation of the behavior of individual farmland value estimates 
collected through opinion surveys of market experts. The ISU Land Value Survey analyzed is 
one of the most widely followed surveys of land values. Second, the empirical results provide 
strong evidence that experts’ estimates conform to an ECM in which they quickly self-correct 
prior errors and almost instantaneously incorporate changes in market price signals. However, 
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experts’ estimates are found to be less informative and noisier for low-quality land, suggesting 
that more trust should be put in the ISU Land Value Survey for high-quality land values than for 
low-quality land values. Finally, the proposed methodological framework, based on the Bayesian 
estimation of an ECM, provides a useful approach to analyze the behavior of individual 
responses in panel data from surveys. In particular, it should prove valuable for surveys 
involving non-stationary variables, unobservable “true” values, or short panels (where correcting 
for Nickell bias is critical). 
 
Model 
The farmland value surveys we are concerned about elicit experts’ opinions about the current 
value of farm real estate of a given quality within a certain market boundary (such as a county). 
Each expert i reports her individual subjective value for the current time period t and her primary 
county c(i), denoted Yi,t, for the unobservable prevailing price of farmland Xc(i),t. Variable Xc(i),t 
could also be interpreted as the unobservable true market value; for brevity, we will refer to Xc(i),t 
as the prevailing price hereafter. Taking logarithms yi,t  ln(Yi,t) and xc(i),t  ln(Xc(i),t), if market 
boundaries are defined such that farmland is homogenous in quality and all other attributes, free 
and complete information would yield 
 
(1) yi,t = xc(i),t + i,t;   i, t, 
 
with essentially zero error i,t. In our application, multiple experts provide estimates for the same 
county, but each individual expert has only one primary county. As a result, xc(i),t = xc(j),t = xc,t for 
experts i and j who report for the same county. 
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To analyze the process by which experts update their subjective valuations, rearrange 
equation (1) after adding and subtracting lagged land price terms, so as to obtain the ECM 
 
(2) yi,t =  (yi,t1  xc(i),t1) + xc(i),t + i,t;   i, t, 
 
where yi,t  yi,t  yi,t1, and xc(i),t  xc(i),t  xc(i),t1. According to this ECM, for an expert’s 
subjective valuation in year t to be identical to the corresponding prevailing price, the change in 
the individual’s valuation from the previous year (i.e., yi,t) must consist of two parts. The first 
component,  (yi,t1  xc(i),t1), is an error-correction term that fully corrects for any difference 
between the expert’s prior subjective valuation and the prior prevailing price. The second 
component, xc(i),t, is the full contemporaneous innovation in the prevailing price, i.e., the change 
in the prevailing price over the past year. Thus, an expert’s subjective valuation will be identical 
to the prevailing price in year t if the expert: (a) fully corrects for the previous year’s difference 
between her subjective valuation and the prevailing price at the time; and, (b) fully incorporates 
the innovation in the prevailing price. 
Our analysis is based on ECM (2). An expert’s error-correction behavior may be driven 
by self-pride, professional ethic, peer pressure, or “herd behavior,” in which the expert leverages 
the collective decisions or information exhibited by other experts in the previous period 
(Banerjee 1992). For estimation and hypothesis testing purposes, we generalize ECM (2) by 
incorporating coefficients multiplying explanatory variables, and decomposing the error into an 
intercept () and a zero-mean residual (ei,t), so as to yield the regression 
 




Regression (3) collapses into ECM (2) when coefficients satisfy the conditions { = 0, y = x 
= x = 1}. Thus, such conditions imply that data are consistent with the ideal scenario where 
experts’ estimates fully reflect prevailing prices. More generally, according to regression (3), the 
innovation in the ith expert’s estimate incorporates a fixed amount of , which is identical for all 
experts, and 100 x percent of the innovation in the prevailing price xc(i),t. In addition, since (y 
yi,t1 + x xc(i),t1) = [y (yi,t1 – xc(i),t1) + (y – x) xc(i),t1], the innovation in the expert’s response 
“corrects” 100 y percent of the lagged error (yi,t1 – xc(i),t1) in a single period, and it includes (y 
– x) of the previous prevailing price xc(i),t1. 
Figure 1, which was briefly discussed in the introduction, illustrates the implications of 
parameters y, x, and x for unobservable prevailing prices (x) given an actual series of observed 
average expert estimates (y) if there were no errors (ei,t = 0  i, t), which is represented by the 
blue line. For simplicity, the graph is drawn by setting  = 0, and the observed average expert 
estimate 10% lower than the unobservable prevailing price at the beginning of the period (i.e., 
year 1980 for panels A and C, and year 2003 for panels B and D). The orange line represents the 
unobservable prevailing prices implied by the observed estimates if the experts’ behavior is 
characterized by {y = x = 0.5, x = 1}. In this instance, the gap between the prevailing price 
and the average expert estimate closes by 50 % per period, and it becomes negligible after a few 
periods because the expert estimate fully incorporates the innovations in the prevailing price {x 
= 1}. The parameterization underlying the green line differs from the one for the orange line only 
in that just half of the prevailing price innovation is incorporated in each period {x = 0.5}. It can 
be seen that the smaller magnitude of parameter x has a profound impact on implied prevailing 
prices, and that it takes many periods without prevailing price innovations to yield a stable 
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negligible gap between average expert estimates and prevailing prices. Figure 1 also shows that 
the situation where y is greater than x, represented by the orange line, results in a consistently 
positive gap between average expert estimates and prevailing prices. Such gap is negative in the 
opposite scenario with y < x, which is omitted to avoid clutter. 
In practice, there is no widely accepted objective measure of the value for a 
representative tract of farmland. A number of attributes of farmland and its market help explain 
this stylized fact. Farmland is heterogeneous in quality, percent tillable, use, and extent of urban 
influence, which renders the sale price of a particular tract quite specific and difficult to 
extrapolate to other tracts. Also, farmland available for sale is fairly limited, especially for arm’s 
length transactions, and farmland markets tend to be localized. Furthermore, actual farmland 
sales are lengthy processes, often taking three to nine months from the time a price is agreed 
upon until the transaction is posted in public county assessor records. As a result, assigning a 
date to a sale price is not a trivial task. 
For the aforementioned reasons, it is useful to allow for systematic biases in experts’ 
opinions. To consider this generalization, let Yi,t = i Xc(i),t for i > 0, with i < (>) 1 meaning 
that the ith expert consistently under-reports (over-reports) the prevailing price. To incorporate 
this feature, regression (3) is generalized as the experts’ fixed-effects (FE) ECM regression (4): 
 
(4) yi,t = i + y yi,t1 + x xc(i),t1+ x xc(i),t+ ei,t, 
 
where i = y ln(i) represents the extent to which the ith expert’s response consistently under- 




Experts’ Estimates in the Long Run, and Their Short-Term Dynamics 
Ideally, regression (4) should satisfy conditions {y = x = x = 1}, so that the innovation on the 
expert’s response (yi,t) fully corrects her previous error (yi,t1  xc(i),t1) in a single period, and 
fully incorporates the innovation in the prevailing price (xc(i),t). In reality, however, an expert 
may take a longer time to revise a previous estimate, in which case lagged innovations in the 
expert’s estimate or in the prevailing price may explain the current innovation. To allow for this 
possibility, we expand regression (4) as 
 








n x n c i t nx    + ei,t, 
 
where s are lagged innovations’ coefficients. 
A nice feature of the ECM is that it is straightforward to infer the “long-run” or 
“equilibrium” relationship between experts’ estimates and the set of explanatory variables (i.e., 
the relationship when neither variable has a tendency to change). To illustrate, consider ECM 
(5)—by setting first-difference terms and residuals equal to zero, dropping time subscripts, and 
rearranging, we obtain equilibrium relationship (6) in logarithms  
 
(6) yi = i/y  x/y xc(i), 
 





   in levels. According to these expressions, x/y is the 
long-run elasticity of experts’ estimates with respect to prevailing land prices. Ideally, such 
elasticity should be characterized by x/y = 1, in which case a 1% change in the prevailing 
price translates into a 1% change of the same sign in the expert estimate in the long run. If 
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x/y > 1, in the long run the expert estimate will increase/decrease by more than 1% in 
response to a 1% increase/decrease in the prevailing price. Ceteris paribus, long-run expert 
estimates will be greater (smaller) than prevailing prices when x/y > 1. Figure 1 illustrates 
scenarios with x/y = 1 and x/y > 1. 
Note also that if the expert’s estimate at time (t – 1) satisfies equilibrium condition (6), 
the time-t expected expert innovation from ECM (5) consists of 
 








n x n c i t nx   . 
 
Thus, the first-difference (i.e., innovation) terms on the right-hand side of ECM (5) represent 
purely short-term dynamics in expert’s estimates. 
 
Drivers of Experts’ Estimates Other Than Land Values 
As already emphasized, a key feature of farmland markets is that they are quite thin, and the 
traded asset is heterogeneous. Hence, we can reasonably hypothesize that experts may resort to 
sources of information other than actual sales to enhance the quality of their estimated values. If 
this is the case, interest rates and farmland rental rates are the most likely candidate sources of 
additional information. The asset capitalization model posits that there should be a long-run 
relationship between land values (X), land rental rates (RENT), and the interest rate (INTEREST). 
More specifically, according to the asset capitalization model, there is a long-run relationship X = 
RENT/INTEREST in levels, or x = rent  interest in logarithms, which implies a long-run 
relationship among experts’ estimates, rental rates, and interest rates, if the asset capitalization 
model holds. However, if the expert knew the prevailing land price, neither rental rates nor 
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interest rates (or any other related variables) should provide relevant information to experts when 
they respond to a land value survey.  
To test the degree to which expert estimates are affected by rental rates and interest rates 
conditional on land values, we fit the following ECM regression: 
 








n x n c i t nx    
 
+ rent rentc(i),t1 + interest interestt1 + rent rentc(i),t + interest interestt  
 








n interest n t ninterest  + ui,t, 
 
where w is the component of variable w orthogonal to the set of regressors in ECM (5); and 
rentc(i),t and interestt denote the first differences (i.e., innovations) in the logarithms of rental 
rates and interest rates, respectively.5 If the w regressors in ECM (8) are significant, then rental 
rates and/or interest rates have an impact on expert responses above and beyond the effect they 
may have on prevailing land prices.6,7  
Finding that coefficients associated with the orthogonal components of land rents or 
interest rates are different from zero suggests that experts use information on land rents and 
interest rates to supplement their knowledge about land values. If experts felt sufficiently 
confident about their knowledge about land values when answering a survey, their responses 
(conditional on such values) should not be affected by rental rates or interest rates.8  
 
Heterogeneity in Farmland Quality 
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Land quality represents a critical source of heterogeneity that makes prevailing land price signals 
for high-quality land more salient than for lower quality land. Heterogeneity is important for 
several reasons. First, experts tend to have a better understanding of productivity for high-quality 
land relative to lower quality land (Zhang and Duffy, 2017). Second, high-quality farmland is 
typically devoted to crop production, whereas low-quality farmland may include recreational 
grounds, pasture, or timberland. Third, there is more variation in price per soil quality index for 
low-quality land than for higher quality land (Zhang and Duffy 2017). Finally, higher quality 
land tends to be more heavily promoted at land auctions, usually receives more local news 
coverage, and is more frequently discussed among producers, landowners, and agricultural 
professionals. As a result, it is natural to hypothesize that experts have better knowledge of 
prevailing prices for high-quality land than that for low-quality land.  
Econometrically, this would suggest that information about prevailing prices for low-
quality land ( ),
L
c i tx  contains more noise. Thus, for low-quality land, the coefficients in equation (4) 
may be more likely to deviate from the ideal conditions {i = 0, y = x = x = 1}, and the 
corresponding error term ,
L
i te  may have a larger variance. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
the magnitude of the under- or over-estimation by experts for low-quality land is more noticeable 
due to noisier market signals than that for high-quality land. The magnitude for {y, x, x} is 
hypothesized to be smaller for low-quality land as well, due to the greater noise.  
With noisier market signals, it is reasonable to expect experts to rely more on additional 
information, such as rental rates and interest rates, when providing value estimates for lower 
quality land. Thus, we also hypothesize that the coefficients associated with the orthogonal 
components of land rents or interest rates {rent, interest, rent, interest, rent, interest} in regression 





Table 1 reports summary statistics for key variables used in our study. Our main data source 
consists of individual expert responses to the annual ISU Land Value Survey from November 
2005 through 2015. Figure 2 shows a sample of the survey questions sent to experts in 
November 2015. In early November, the survey solicits experts for their opinions about land 
values per acre for high-, medium-, and low-quality land for average-sized farms in their primary 
county as of November 1st (i.e., a few days earlier). That is, expert opinions essentially represent 
estimates of current land values, as opposed to forecasts of future values. Experts are mainly 
agricultural professionals knowledgeable about land markets, such as farm managers, rural 
appraisers, agricultural lenders, real estate brokers, and county assessors. Previous research has 
shown that on average these expert estimates from this survey are similar to farmland sales 
prices (Stinn and Duffy 2012).  
The data structure consists of an unbalanced panel, because not every expert participates 
in the survey each year. To avoid having too few time series observations for any individual, in 
our regressions we only use estimates (yi,t) from experts who participated in at least seven of the 
eleven surveys. Thus, the study involves responses from 311 experts, 36% of whom participated 
in all surveys during the period, and 12%, 16%, 18%, and 18% of whom provided responses in 
ten, nine, eight, and seven of the surveys, respectively. 
In general, there were more experts in northern and central Iowa than in southern Iowa, 
which is consistent with the distribution of farms and tillable farmland across the state. In 
particular, the Northwest Iowa and Northeast Iowa crop reporting districts (CRDs) each 
comprises more than 14% of experts, whereas the East-Central Iowa and Southern Iowa CRDs 
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each accounts for less than 10% of experts. The vast majority (82%) of experts gave land value 
estimates for only one county, and only 7% of experts furnished estimates for more than three 
counties. For consistency, if an expert provided land value estimates for more than one county, 
only estimates for her primary county were used for our analysis. 
As discussed previously, there is no objective, readily available measure of the prevailing 
land price (Xt), especially at the county level. Given this limitation, our analysis is performed 
using the following proxies for the unobservable prevailing price corresponding to expert i’s 
estimates: (a) county median estimate (the median of estimates from all experts for land of a 
particular quality in expert i’s county); (b) CRD median estimate (the median of the county 
median estimates defined in (a) for expert i’s CRD); (c) Farm Credit Services (FCS) county 
average sales price based on arm’s length transactions of cropland parcels that are at least 85% 
tillable; (d) FCS CRD median price (the median of the FCS county prices defined in (c) for 
expert i's CRD); (e) Realtors Land Institute (RLI) CRD average value; and (f) ISU CRD average 
value. 
To extract as much information as possible from the data, the medians for cases (a) and 
(b) are constructed using the entire set of experts (i.e., not restricted to experts who participated 
in at least seven of the eleven surveys). The rationale for using medians instead of averages to 
construct the prevailing price proxies is to avoid having the latter unduly affected by outliers. 
This concern is especially strong at the county level because the number of experts for any given 
county is relatively small, which makes the average more vulnerable to extreme values. The 
number of expert responses used to construct county median land values ranged from a low of 
three to a high of eleven, with an average of seven per county. 
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The FCS county price series (c) consists of the average sales prices for all arm’s length 
transactions for cropland that is at least 85% tillable, regardless of whether sales are financed by 
FCS or not (Zhang 2016). Unlike the other series, FCS series (c) and (d) do not discriminate 
among high-, medium-, and low-quality land. However, the FCS series most likely involve larger 
shares of high-quality land than low-quality land because of the 85% tillable restriction. 
Furthermore, the FCS sales prices series are not published or publicized, so it is more difficult 
for respondents to access when they do not work at the Farm Credit System banks.  
Series (b), (d), (e), and (f) are constructed to represent CRD-level values. Given that the 
ISU survey asks for county-level estimates, using CRD-level series to proxy prevailing prices 
might seem problematic. However, CRD-level series are relevant for at least three reasons. First, 
CRD-level variables are subject to less sample variability because they are based on larger 
samples (e.g., on average, CRD medians rely on 36 expert responses, compared to just seven 
responses for county medians). Second, experts are likely to consider information on land values 
beyond their own counties due to the thinness and spatial connectedness of farmland markets. 
Third, model (6) accommodates this scenario if county-level estimates are proportional to CRD-
level prevailing prices. 
The RLI CRD series (e) consists of the September values for tillable cropland reported by 
the RLI Iowa Chapter Survey (Hansen 2018). Notably, RLI survey directly asks for CRD- rather 
than county-level estimates, and it mainly surveys farm managers, who also represent 15% of the 
ISU surveyed experts. Finally, the ISU CRD series (f) is the average of the individual expert 
primary county estimates across all respondents to the ISU survey with primary counties located 
within a particular CRD. This average is released every year during mid-December and is meant 
to represent the land value as of November 1 for that particular year. Series (f) and (b) are 
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different because (f) is the simple average across all raw responses, whereas (b) is the median 
expert response. 
The land rent is the average cash rent at the CRD and county level published every May 
from the ISU Cash Rent Survey (Plastina 2018), a producer and landowner opinion survey. 
Finally, the interest rate is the state-average interest rate on farm real estate published each 
October from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago quarterly Land Values and Credit Conditions 
Survey (Oppedahl 2018). 
 
Econometric Estimation 
We estimate the proposed ECM using Bayesian methods. A comprehensive description of the 
methods is somewhat involved; hence, for the sake of clarity, in the remainder of this section we 
present an overview, relegating details to Appendix A. 
The Bayesian estimation allows us to avoid a number of issues that would arise if we 
were to perform inference under classical methods for the case of non-stationary farmland 
values.9 Regardless of whether farmland values are stationary or not, given the proposed ECM 
structure, Bayesian methods allow us to estimate the parameters’ posterior distributions in a 
straightforward manner, conditional on the initial set of observations of the model variables 
(Lancaster 2002). Such posterior distributions can then be employed to test various hypotheses of 
interest, as desired.10 Furthermore, as explained next, the proposed approach also allows us to 
address two important issues with the present data, namely, the Nickell bias (Nickell 1981) and 
errors-in-variables. 
The Nickell bias arises when estimating FE panel models with lagged dependent 
variables using standard methods (e.g., ordinary least squares and standard maximum 
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likelihood), because in that case the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased 
(Nickell 1981). The Nickell bias is negative if the first-order autoregressive coefficient is 
positive, and it is worse for shorter panels (Nickell 1981). To deal with the Nickell bias, we 
resort to the method recently developed by Dhaene and Jochmans (2016), who generalize 
Lancaster’s (2002) orthogonal reparameterization approach.11 By appropriately reparemeterizing 
the FEs, this approach allows one to estimate the “common parameters” (i.e., parameters other 
than the FEs) independently of the FEs and circumvent the Nickell bias.  
The errors-in-variables problem is the result of using proxies for prevailing land prices, 
which are unobservable. The errors in the proxies are incorporated into the estimation by 
adopting the classical errors-in-variables assumption that the cth county proxy variable ( ,c tx ) is a 
noisy but unbiased measure of the unobservable prevailing price (xc,t) (Fuller 1987):12 
 
(9) ,c tx  = xc,t + c,t, 
 
where xc,t ~ N(x, 
2
x ), c,t ~ N(0, 
2
 ) and independent of xc,t, and N(, 
2) denotes the normal 
distribution with mean  and variance 2. 
Following the recommendations by Gelman (https://github.com/stan-dev/stan/wiki/Prior-
Choice-Recommendations), we adopt weakly informative priors for the Bayesian estimation. 
Priors are assumed to be distributed as Student’s t for the regression coefficients, and as half-
Cauchy for the standard deviations. All prior distributions are parameterized so that priors have 
standard deviations at least 10 times larger than the corresponding posteriors, ensuring that 
posteriors are driven mostly by the data rather than the priors. 
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Estimation is performed using RStan (https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/rstan/vignettes/rstan.html), the R interface to Stan in the R version 
3.5.1 programming language and software environment (https://www.r-project.org). Stan 2.19.0 
is employed to implement Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling with the No-U-Turn 
sampler (Stan Development Team 2019). For each of the estimated regressions, the HMC 
procedure is conducted using four chains, each of them consisting of 2,000 iterations. The first 
1,000 iterations of each chain are discarded as a burn-in period. The Gelman-Rubin test (Gelman 
and Rubin 1992) is then applied to check the convergence of the remaining part of the chains for 
each of the parameters.  
Upon convergence, the 4,000 simulated values for each parameter are taken to be draws 
from the parameter’s posterior marginal distribution. The 4,000 sets of simulated parameters are 
also used to obtain the posterior distributions for some values of interest, such as the long-run 
elasticity x/y, which should equal one if y = x, as hypothesized by the restricted ECM.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Estimation results are summarized in tables 2 through 5. For each parameter (or function of 
parameters) of interest, the tables report the mean, standard deviation (within parentheses), and 
the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles (within brackets) of the estimated posterior distribution. Such 
quantiles constitute the upper and lower bounds of the 95% credible intervals (CIs) for the 
respective parameters. CIs are the Bayesian analogs of confidence intervals in classical methods. 
The tables also report the posterior mean, standard deviation, and 95% CI for the Bayesian R2 of 
each estimated model.13 Gelman-Rubin test statistics are not reported because they are smaller 
than 1.005 in all instances, which provides strong evidence of convergence.  
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Table 2 presents estimation results for regression (5) (i.e., the basic ECM with no FEs). 
Columns I-III showcase results for high-, medium-, and low-quality land using prevailing prices 
proxied by experts’ median subjective valuations at the county level, whereas columns IV-VI 
present results at the CRD level. The error-correction coefficients (y and x) exhibit the 
expected signs, because their posterior means and virtually their entire posterior distributions are 
on the expected side of zero. The posterior means of y and x indicate that experts’ opinions 
only correct about 20% of the previous error in a single year. The posterior mean of the 
coefficient for the contemporaneous prevailing price innovation (x) is small. However, this 
coefficient is significantly negative, in the sense that the 95% CI consists entirely of negative 
numbers, which is the opposite of what would be expected. The coefficients on lagged 
innovations (y and x) are also significantly different from zero, suggesting relatively strong 
short-term dynamics. 
Overall, estimates of the ECM with no FEs reported in table 2 are substantially different 
from the ideal scenario in which experts’ opinions fully reflect prevailing prices (i.e., { = 0, y 
= x = x = 1}). This is likely the result of the single, common intercept imposed by this model, 
which does not reflect the fact that experts may possess different subjective beliefs about 
prevailing land prices, due to their heterogeneous knowledge, experience, and perceptions of the 
market and other relevant signals. When considered in light of the implied prevailing price 
dynamics illustrated in Figure 1, the estimated ECM with no FEs --with low y and x, and 
negative x -- seems to provide a very poor representation of the behavior of experts’ opinions. 
Therefore, the remainder of the discussion focuses on results for the FE ECM regressions. 
Table 3 presents results for our preferred FE ECMs. For example, the first column shows 
that for high-quality land, taking the county-level median as a proxy for the prevailing price, and 
20 
 
holding other characteristics constant, an individual expert’s opinion will correct about 88% of 
the error she made in the immediately preceding year, and incorporate about 87% of the 
contemporaneous prevailing price innovation. Furthermore, the expert’s opinion exhibits no 
short-term dynamics, as the coefficients for the lagged innovations have very small posterior 
means and 95% CIs that include zero.14 
The estimates reported in table 3 provide strong evidence that experts’ opinions conform 
to an ECM with almost instantaneous adjustments, where experts not only promptly self-correct 
prior errors but also almost instantaneously fully incorporate innovations in the prevailing price. 
In addition, there is no evidence of short-term dynamics in experts’ opinions, as the 95% CIs for 
coefficients y and x include zero. Importantly, the long-run elasticity of experts’ responses with 
respect to the prevailing price conforms to the theoretically consistent coefficient of one for all 
specifications shown in table 3. Not only do long-run elasticities have posterior means very close 
to one, but also all of their 95% CIs contain the unit value. 
Even though the posterior distributions of the long-run elasticities are very similar across 
land qualities, table 3 reveals a clear pattern regarding the speed at which experts self-correct and 
incorporate new market information depending on the quality of the land for which they furnish 
opinions. For example, the posterior mean speed at which an expert corrects her prior error falls 
from about 90% for high-quality land, to around 84% and 66% for medium- and low-quality 
land, respectively. Similarly, parameter x’s posterior means indicate that expert opinions 
incorporate about 87% of the contemporaneous innovation in the prevailing price for high-
quality land, compared to 84% and 77% for medium- and low-quality land. In addition, the 
model explains a larger proportion of the variance of predicted values for higher quality land, as 
demonstrated by the Bayesian R2s: posterior means for high-, medium, and low-quality land are 
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respectively 0.853, 0.828, and 0.758, and the 95% CIs do not overlap. Similarly, residual 
standard deviations have posterior means that become larger as land quality worsens (increasing 
from 0.151 for high quality to 0.218 for low quality), and non-overlapping 95% CIs. 
The results suggest that land market signals are more informative in explaining experts’ 
land value estimates for high-quality land than for lower quality land. Possible reasons for this 
fact are that low-quality land exhibits greater heterogeneity in quality and percent tillable, larger 
variation in price per soil quality index, and fewer high-profile auction sales, resulting in less 
public attention when compared to high-quality land. It is also plausible that experts are more 
likely to remember higher-priced land auction sales. Previous research has found a wider range 
for both the productivity index and the price paid productivity index unit associated with lower 
quality land (Zhang and Duffy 2017).  
Table 4 presents a robustness check incorporating orthogonal components of interest 
rates and cash rents into the key specification (i.e., regression (8)). Table 4 shows that most of 
the 95% CIs for the cash rent and interest rate coefficients do not include zero, indicating that 
they are statistically significant. Overall, however, the impact of cash rents and the interest rate 
on experts’ opinions is relatively small, because the posterior distributions of the residual 
standard deviation and the Bayesian R2 are very similar to their counterparts in table 3. 
The effects of cash rents and the interest rate tend to be larger for medium- and low-
quality land compared to those for high-quality land. This is consistent with the notion that 
experts use information about cash rents and interest rates to supplement and refine their 
opinions, especially when land market signals are noisier (as is the case with lower quality land). 
Furthermore, experts seem to respond more strongly to information about the interest rate 
compared to cash rents. This finding could be due to the fact that interest rates are more uniform 
22 
 
across the nation and thus arguably more salient signals to all experts, whereas cash rent data are 
more heterogeneous and stickier in nature. Leases often last longer than one year; hence, cash 
rents may take some time to reflect changes in crop and livestock market fundamentals driving 
innovations in land values. 
Finally, we present robustness checks to assess the stability of our results based on 
alternative proxies for prevailing prices, instead of the median expert response used in the main 
specification. First, table 5 presents estimates obtained by proxying the true land values with the 
county-level average sales price for arm’s length transactions of 85% tillable cropland collected 
by FCS. A comparison of tables 3 and 5 shows that our main results regarding experts’ error-
correction behavior remain qualitatively similar. However, the experts’ opinions incorporate a 
significantly smaller share of the contemporaneous innovations in the prevailing price, long-run 
elasticities are smaller than the theoretically consistent value of one, and there are significant 
lagged dynamics.15 Possible reasons for these results are that the FCS prices correspond to 85% 
tillable cropland, which may mostly comprise high-quality tracts; they are only available for the 
relatively high price years from 2008 to 2015; and they are an average of the sales prices over the 
year, rather than a value at a specific point in time (i.e., November 1st for the ISU survey). 
Finally, we report in Appendix C several robustness checks using land value estimates 
from two publicly released surveys as proxies for the prevailing prices, or using different 
configurations of our estimation samples. Table C uses publicly released CRD average values 
from RLI and ISU surveys. Overall, a comparison of table 3 with this table shows that our main 
results regarding experts’ error-correction behavior remain qualitatively similar. Specifically, 
experts self-correct most of the errors in the preceding year in one period, and incorporate most 
of the contemporaneous innovation in the prevailing price. Further, the error-correction behavior 
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and the incorporation of the contemporaneous innovation are more pronounced for high-quality 
land than for lower quality land. Our results are also robust when using subsamples based on 
types of respondents and number of experts used to construct the median expert estimates (see 
tables C.2 and C.3). 
 
Conclusions 
Using a panel data of 311 agricultural experts responding to the ISU Land Value Survey from 
2005 through 2015, we develop an ECM model to examine how experts update their responses 
over time. This updating behavior is critically important for the accuracy of expert opinion 
surveys like the Iowa survey, as it can be severely reduced if experts fail to fully correct prior 
errors and do not fully adjust their estimates to incorporate innovations in prevailing land prices. 
Our main results provide strong evidence that experts’ survey responses exhibit error-
correction behavior with almost instantaneous adjustments in just one period. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of the prevailing farmland prices, including the county-level 
average sales prices for arm’s length transactions of cropland parcels that are at least 85% 
tillable. We also find that the speed at which experts correct prior errors and incorporate 
contemporaneous innovations is faster for high-quality land than that for lower quality land. This 
result is likely due to noisier land market signals for low-quality land, largely stemming from its 
greater variability in soil quality index and price paid per soil quality index point; 
consequentially, cash rents and interest rates tend to play a larger role in determining experts’ 
responses for lower quality land.  
Our research has important implications for policymakers, agricultural professionals, and 
researchers of farmland markets in general, especially given the pervasive use of opinion surveys 
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to gauge movements in land markets. Furthermore, expert opinion surveys like the Iowa survey 
analyzed in our paper are often the only source of land values at the county level. By providing 
empirical evidence that experts in land opinion surveys exhibit theoretically-consistent error-
correction behavior with almost instantaneous adjustments to market signals, our analysis lends 
support to the accuracy of widely watched expert opinion surveys of land values conducted by 
land-grant universities and Federal Reserve banks. In addition, our findings on land quality 
shows that readers of these popular opinion surveys should pay more attention to results for 
high-quality land, and should exercise caution in interpreting and quoting results for low-quality 
land. Finally, our analysis focusing on experts’ error-correction behavior suggests that devising 
estimation-correction techniques to adjust and improve the accuracy of land value surveys is a 
promising future research line, especially for low-quality land.  
Of course, our research is not without limitations. First, because true farmland values are 
unobservable, we rely on noisy proxy variables to measure them, which may introduce errors in 
our estimation. To address this issue, our Bayesian approach employs an errors-in-variables 
approach, treating true values as unknown parameters with the proxy variables being their noisy 
signals or measurements. Second, although we use the median expert estimate as a proxy for the 
prevailing price in the base specification, experts do not directly observe the median response at 
the time of the survey. Instead, they could potentially see the publicly released land value 
estimates from the ISU survey, the RLI survey and, to a lesser extent, the FCS cropland prices. 
Various robustness checks show that our main conclusions of error-correction behavior with 
almost instantaneous adjustments remain robust to these alternative specifications and samples. 
Finally, the error-correction behavior uncovered in our research is arguably more transferrable 
for expert opinion surveys rather than producer or consumer surveys. 
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Our analysis focuses on an expert opinion survey of farmland values. However, we 
conjecture that the error-correction behavior uncovered here is likely to characterize individual 
responses to a host of other opinion surveys. Our Bayesian approach may prove well suited for 
this task, as such surveys often involve non-stationary variables, unobservable “true” values, 
and/or short panels. This avenue of research is left for future studies to explore. Also worth 
pursuing in the future is the application of the present results to develop methods aimed at 
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Figure 1. Average Expert Estimates to the ISU Survey and Unobservable Prevailing Prices implied by Different Parameters for Low 
Quality Land in South Central Iowa, 1980 to 2019. 
   
 
 





Table 1. Summary Statistics of Main Variables used to Perform Regressions 
Variable Description Average Std. Dev. Min Max # Obs 
High-quality land value estimate ($/acre)  7232 3335 756 20000 2880 
Medium-quality land value estimate ($/acre)  5582 2633 610 16000 2880 
Low-quality land value estimate ($/acre)  3880 1969 280 12000 2880 
CRD median of experts’ value estimates for high-
quality land ($/acre)  
7033 2854 2350 13200 2880 
CRD median of experts’ value estimates for 
medium-quality land ($/acre)  
5286 2183 1500 10000 2880 
CRD median of experts’ value estimates for low-
quality land ($/acre) 
3584 1446 1100 7000 2880 
County median of experts’ value estimates for high-
quality land ($/acre) 
7055 3061 1825 19750 2861 
County median of experts’ value estimates for 
medium-quality land ($/acre) 
5330 2354 1150 14750 2860 
County median of experts’ value estimates for low-
quality land ($/acre) 
3681 1697 800 10750 2859 
Number of years that respondents provided land 
value estimates 
10 1 7 11 2880 
Average cash rent at the CRD level ($/acre) 203 53 110 306 2880 
Average cash rent at the county level ($/acre) 204 55 93 363 2880 
Chicago Fed January farmland loan interest rate (% 
per year) 
5.86 1.06 4.61 7.74 2880 
ISU published farmland values for high-quality 
land at the CRD level as of Nov 1st ($/acre) 
7148 2830 2659 12890 2880 
ISU published farmland values for medium-quality 
land at the CRD level as of Nov 1st ($/acre) 
5525 2209 1725 11011 2880 
ISU published farmland values for low-quality land 
at the CRD level as of Nov 1st ($/acre) 
3824 1466 1252 7162 2880 
RLI published cropland values for high-quality land 
at the CRD level as of September 1st ($/acre) 
7174 2922 2971 13337 2880 
RLI published cropland values for medium-quality 
land at the CRD level as of September 1st ($/acre) 
5614 2147 2351 10303 2880 
ISU published cropland values for low-quality land 
at the CRD level as of September 1st ($/acre) 
4016 1341 1919 6957 2880 
Mean sales prices for 85% tillable cropland at the 
county level from Farm Credit Services of America 
($/acre) 





Table 2. Posterior Distribution Estimates of Error-Correction Model with No Fixed Effects, Assuming that the Median of Experts’ 
Opinions is a Proxy for the Unobservable True Land Value 
 
 True Value Proxy: Experts’ County Median True Value Proxy: Experts’ CRD Median 
High-Quality Medium-Quality Low-Quality High-Quality Medium-Quality Low-Quality 
yt1 -.190*** (.010) -.189*** (.011) -.200*** (.012) -.190*** (.011) -.188*** (.011) -.199*** (.012) 
 [-.211, -.169] [-.210, -.167] [-.224, -.175] [-.211, -.169] [-.210, -.166] [-.224, -.175] 
xt1 .231*** (.011) .217*** (.012) .200*** (.013) .231*** (.011) .216*** (.012) .200*** (.014) 
 [.211, .254] [.194, .240] [.174, .227] [.210, .253] [.195, .240] [.173, .228] 
xt -.131*** (.029) -.159*** (.031) -.202*** (.032) -.132*** (.029) -.160*** (.031) -.203*** (.033) 
 [-.190, -.075] [-.221, -.099] [-.268, -.140] [-.189, -.078] [-.225, -.103] [-.266, -.140] 
yt1 -.313*** (.021) -.326*** (.021) -.279*** (.021) -.312*** (.021) -.327*** (.021) -.280*** (.021) 
 [-.353, -.272] [-.368, -.286] [-.320, -.238] [-.354, -.271] [-.368, -.286] [-.321, -.240] 
xt1 -.182*** (.031) -.259*** (.033) -.288*** (.035) -.182*** (.030) -.260*** (.033) -.288*** (.034) 
 [-.244, -.122] [-.324, -.195] [-.357, -.220] [-.242, -.125] [-.325, -.198] [-.356, -.222] 
Intercept -.194 (.147) -.067 (.148) .158 (.157) -.186 (.152) -.062 (.148) .157 (.161) 
 [-.493, .088] [-.359, .220] [-.156, .467] [-.483, .098] [-.368, .222] [-.162, .473] 
Long-Run 1.223*** (.100) 1.156*** (.101) 1.006*** (.099) 1.218*** (.103) 1.153*** (.101) 1.007*** (.102) 
Elasticity [1.046, 1.441] [.974, 1.370] [.827, 1.213] [1.038, 1.431] [.973, 1.372] [.824, 1.220] 
Std. Deviation .191*** (.003) .211*** (.003) .252*** (.004) .191*** (.003) .211*** (.003) .252*** (.004) 
of Residuals [.185, .197] [.205, .218] [.244, .260] [.185, .197] [.205, .218] [.244, .260] 
Bayesian R2 .803 (.006) .781 (.007) .720 (.008) .803 (.006) .780 (.007) .721 (.009) 
 [.791 .814] [.767, .794] [.703, .737] [.790, .814] [.767, .794] [.702, .737] 
Observations 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 1,990 
 
*** (**,*) Different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance, based on the respective 99% (95%, 90%) Credible Interval. 




Table 3. Posterior Distribution Estimates of Error-Correction Model with Individual Expert Fixed Effects, Assuming that the Median of 
Experts’ Opinions is a Proxy for the Unobservable True Land Value 
 
 County Level CRD Level 
High-Quality Medium-Quality Low-Quality High-Quality Medium-Quality Low-Quality 
yt1 -.883*** (.038) -.829*** (.037) -.657*** (.035) -.882*** (.039) -.830**** (.037) -.658*** (.036) 
 [-.956, -.808] [-.901, -.756] [-.728, -.590] [-.959, -.805] [-.901, -.759] [-.726, -.588] 
xt1 .901*** (.059) .857*** (.058) .657*** (.053) .898*** (.060) .857*** (.058) .657*** (.052) 
 [.792, 1.018] [.755, .978] [.557, .767] [.794, 1.027] [.753, .979] [.562, .766] 
xt .868*** (.047) .835*** (.047) .772*** (.046) .867*** (.048) .835*** (.047) .772*** (.046) 
 [.791, .969] [.756, .937] [.693, .870] [.790, .972] [.756, .935] [.693, .871] 
yt1 .029 (.026) .002 (.027) -.049* (.025) .028 (.026) .003 (.026) -.049* (.026) 
 [-.023, .081] [-.051, .054] [-.100, .001] [-.023, .079] [-.049, .054] [-.098, .003] 
xt1 -.008 (.035) -.016 (.037) .021 (.036) -.008 (.035) -.017 (.037) .021 (.037) 
 [-.074, .063] [-.087, .054] [-.049, .091] [-.078, .061] [-.088, .055] [-.051, .092] 
Intercept 310 individual 310 individual 310 individual 310 individual 310 individual 310 individual 
 expert FEs expert FEs expert FEs expert FEs expert FEs expert FEs 
Long-Run 1.020*** (.049) 1.033*** (.051) .999*** (.056) 1.019*** (.050) 1.033*** (.051) .999*** (.056) 
Elasticity [.944, 1.127] [.954, 1.147] [.903, 1.116] [.946, 1.129] [.953, 1.146] [.905, 1.120] 
Std. Deviation .151*** (.003) .174*** (.003) .218*** (.004) .151*** (.003) .174*** (.003) .218*** (.004) 
of Residuals [.146, .157] [.168, .180] [.211, .226] [.146, .156] [.168, .180] [.211, .226] 
Bayesian R2 .853 (.005) 0.828 (.006) .758 (.009) .853 (.005) 0.828 (.006) .758 (.009) 
 [.842, .863] [.815, .840] [.740, .776] [.842, .863] [.815, .840] [.740, .776] 
Observations 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 1,989 
 
*** (**,*) Different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance, based on the respective 99% (95%, 90%) Credible Interval. 




Table 4. Robustness Checks for FE ECMs Incorporating Orthogonal Components of Interest Rates and Rental Rates 
 True Value Proxy: Experts’ County Median 
High-Quality  Medium-Quality  Low-Quality  
yt1 -.885*** (.038) -.833*** (.037) -.661*** (.035) 
 [-.958, -.810] [-.905, -.761] [-.725, -.590] 
xt1 .902*** (.060) .863*** (.058) .661*** (.053) 
 [.794, 1.033] [.758, .986] [.562, .771] 
xt .867*** (.047) .837*** (.048) .773*** (.045) 
 [.789, .972] [.758, .941] [.695, .870] 
yt1 .029 (.026) .004 (.026) -.048* (.026) 
 [-.022, .080] [-.047, .055] [-.101, .004] 
xt1 -.009 (.035) -.018 (.036) .021 (.037) 
 [-.076, .060] [-.089, .053] [-.053, .093] 
rentt1 .009 (.213) -.211 (.239) -.452 (.287) 
 [-.404, .419] [-.675, .258] [-1.022, .108] 
interestt1 -.845*** (.324) -.999*** (.345) -1.485*** (.373) 
 [-1.480, -.206] [-1.683, -.308] [-2.206, -.754] 
rentt .311** (.140) .335** (.155) .404** (.180) 
 [.037, .584] [.031, .636] [.048, .766] 
interestt -.550*** (.212) -.543** (.231) -.394 (.282) 
 [-.950, -.125] [-.991, -.084] [-.948, .151] 
rentt1 .301** (.126) -.369*** (.136) .432** (.165) 
 [.058, .553] [.102, .637] [.111, .761] 
interestt1 .425** (.205) .594*** (.221) .818*** (.262) 
 [.017, .819] [.165, 1.040] [.306, 1.347] 
Intercept 310 ind. expert FEs 310 ind. expert FEs 310 ind. expert FEs 
Long-Run 1.019*** (.050) 1.036*** (.052) .999*** (.056) 
Elasticity [.944, 1.129] [.954, 1.150] [.905, 1.120] 
Std. Deviation .150*** (.003) .173*** (.003) .216*** (.004) 
of Residuals [.145, .156] [.167, .179] [.208, .223] 
Bayesian R2 .855 (.005) .830 (.006) .764 (.009) 
 [.844, .865] [.818, .842] [.745, .781] 
Observations 1,989 1,989 1,989 
*** (**,*) Different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance, based on the respective 99% (95%, 90%) Credible Interval. 
Note: The table reports posterior means, posterior standard deviations (within parentheses), and 95% credible intervals [within brackets]. 
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Table 5. Robustness Checks for FE ECMs Assuming Unobservable True Land Values are Proxied by Average Sales Prices for 85% 
Tillable Cropland Collected by the Farm Credit Services of America 
 
 True Value Proxy: FCS County Average Sales Prices for 85% Tillable Cropland 
High-Quality Medium-Quality Low-Quality 
yt1 -.896*** (.050) -.885*** (.048) -.830*** (.046) 
 [-.993, -.796] [-.977, -.793] [-.922, -.737] 
xt1 .754*** (.075) .733*** (.072) .658*** (.070) 
 [.610, .905] [.595, .886] [.527, .802] 
xt .599*** (.052) .543*** (.057) .454*** (.063) 
 [.501, .704] [.437, .659] [.334, .581] 
yt1 .081** (.033) .039 (.031) .039 (.031) 
 [.017, .146] [-.021, .101] [-.022, .099] 
xt1 .174*** (.049) .163*** (.049) .180*** (.054) 
 [.078, .270] [.072, .259] [.077, .286] 
Intercept 286 individual 286 individual 286 individual 
 expert FEs expert FEs expert FEs 
Long-Run .841*** (.054) .827*** (.057) .793*** (.063) 
Elasticity [.741, .956] [.724, .946] [.676, .922] 
Std. Deviation .180*** (.004) .196*** (.005) .236*** (.006) 
of Residuals [.172, .188] [.187, .205] [.225, .247] 
Bayesian R2 .703 (.017) 0.660 (.018) .573 (.022) 
 [.668, .736] [.623, .695] [.528, .615] 
Observations 1,312 1,312 1,312 
 
*** (**,*) Different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance, based on the respective 99% (95%, 90%) Credible Interval. 




1 Recently, several start-up companies, such as Granular AcreValue and FarmlandFinder, have tried to 
build showcase farmland sale prices. County assessors’ offices increasingly utilize web interfaces such as 
Beacon and Vanguard, which allow current and future landowners and home buyers to search and view 
characteristics of residential houses and land parcels. However, this information is still very fragmented, 
limited to only the most recent sales, and lacks standardized formats.  
2 For simplicity, in the remainder of the study we will use the term “expert” to refer to a respondent to a 
farmland value survey.  
3 The technical details underlying Figure 1 will be described in the Model section.   
4 Nickell bias refers to the bias in the lagged dependent variable coefficient when dynamic fixed-effects 
panel models are estimated using a short time series and standard regression procedures. 
5 For a given set of variables V, variable w can be decomposed as the sum w = b V + w(V), where b is a 
conformable vector of coefficients and w(V) is orthogonal to V. Thus, w(V) can be interpreted as the 
additional information contained in w, conditional on V. By construction, the ordinary least squares 
estimator b = (VT V)1 VT w yields the desired decomposition. We use this fact to obtain the w regressors 
in ECM (8) as the residuals of an ordinary least squares regression of the corresponding variable w on the 
set of ECM (5) regressors.  
6 An alternative approach to fitting regression (8) would be to use as regressors the original variables w 
instead of their orthogonal components w. It is straightforward to demonstrate that the residuals of the 
resulting regression are identical to the ones in ECM (8) (ui,t), so that, as a whole, the explanatory power 
of the respective set of regressors is identical under the two alternative formulations. However, the 
regression with the original variables w exhibits clear multi-collinearity problems, due to the fact that land 
values, rental rates, and interest rates are very highly correlated, which makes it difficult to test the 
hypothesis under investigation. Thus, and especially given that the present objective is to test whether 
rental rates and interest rates provide information conditional on true land values, regression (8) is better 
suited for the task at hand. 
7 The coefficients based on the expert responses (y) and the true land values (x) should be the same in 
ECMs (5) and (8), because by construction the regressors are orthogonal to the w variables. In essence, 
the proposed regression (8) is equivalent to postulating that the residual in ECM (5) behaves according to 
 ei,t = rent rentc(i),t1 + interest interestt1 + rent rentc(i),t + interest interestt  
 








interest n t nn interest  + ui,t. 
8 Note that the survey asks experts what the land value is, as opposed to what it should be. To illustrate 
the importance of this distinction, consider the hypothetical example of ECM (5) satisfying the ideal 
conditions {i, y, x, x, y, x} = {0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0}, and that conditions at period t are such that (yi,t1  
xc(i),t1) = xc(i),t = 0. Hence, the ith expert’s expected response innovation should be yi,t = 0, because her 
time-(t – 1) estimate was in equilibrium with the true land value, and there is no innovation in the true 
value. However, if the coefficients for the w variables in regression (8) are not zero, then the expert’s 
expected response innovation need not be zero. For example, if rentc(i),t > 0, rent > 0, and all other w 
coefficients in (8) are zero, the expert’s expected response innovation will be positive (yi,t = rent 
rentc(i),t > 0) rather than zero. It may be argued that this expert response is warranted because in this 
scenario the capitalization model indicates that the land value could be expected to adjust upward in the 
future in response to the orthogonal increase in land rents. The fallacy in this argument is that experts are 
asked to report their estimates of the true land value xt, not what the land value should be according to the 
capitalization model (i.e., rentt  interestt), or any other theoretical valuation model for that matter. 
Finding coefficients {rent, interest, rent, interest, rent, interest} significantly different from zero in (8) 
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suggests that experts rely on information about rents and interest rates to gauge the value of land when 
they answer the survey. 
9 Even though ECMs are typically used in conjunction with non-stationary variables to represent (and 
test) cointegrating relationships, ECMs can also be used to represent the dynamics of stationary variables 
(De Boef and Keele 2008). However, in the case of classical econometrics, appropriate inference would 
require determining whether farmland values are stationary. This assertion is true because if farmland 
values are non-stationary, which is most likely to be the case (see, e.g., Lence 2001; 2014), standard 
classical inference methods no longer apply to conduct hypothesis testing in regressions like ECM (5). 
Thus, under a classical approach, one must first test whether farmland values are stationary or not. This 
can be done by means of the test proposed by Harris and Tzavalis (1999), which is designed for testing 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity using panel data characterized by short time series and large cross 
sections. If farmland values are found to be non-stationary, the significance of the lagged land value 
coefficient can be tested using a homogeneous panel ECM cointegration test. A popular test for this 
purpose is the one introduced by Westerlund (2007), whose null hypothesis is no cointegration (i.e., that 
the lagged expert estimate coefficient equals zero). 
10 This feature proves useful here, because the long-run elasticity x/y is a nonlinear function of y. In 
this instance, the Bayesian approach allows us to compute the elasticity posterior in a straightforward 
manner (i.e., it is not necessary to use approximations like the delta method). 
11 Pickup et al. (2017) discuss alternative methods to account for the Nickell bias, including the popular 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach advocated by Arellano and Bond (1991), and provide 
evidence that Lancaster’s method outperforms GMM. Similarly, Dhaene and Jochmans (2016) find that 
their approach performs better than GMM for a set of simulated scenarios. 
12 Recall that xc(i),t = xc(j),t = xc,t if experts i and j report for the same county c. 
13 The Bayesian R2, defined as the ratio of the variance of predicted values to the sum of the predicted 
variance and the expected error variance, estimates the share of variance explained for new data (Gelman 
et al., 2019). 
14 For the sake of completeness, table B.1 in Appendix B reports the analog of table 3 but without Nickell 
bias correction (i.e., excluding the last term from likelihood (A3)). Not correcting for the Nickell bias 
would mislead one to overestimate the speed at which experts correct their prior errors by over 20%, and 
into inferring significant short-term dynamics. 
15 The 95% CIs for coefficient x in table 5 are entirely to the left of the corresponding posterior means in 
table 4, the upper bounds of the 95% CIs for the long-run elasticities are smaller than one, and the 95% 
CIs for the lagged difference coefficient do not include zero.  
